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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
P I a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , 
- v -
RUSSELL G. SLCWE, SR., 
D e f e n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t . 
Case No. 19990 & 20070 
RESPONSE TO DEPENDANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS OBJECTION TO JURY 
INSTRUCTION 6 ( 3 ) IN CASE NO. 1 9 9 9 0 . 
Although defendant objected to Instruct ion 6 ( 3 ) , he did 
so on the bas i s that the presumption contained in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-402(1) does not apply in a thef t by rece iv ing case 
(T. 163-167) . Defendant reasoned that the presumption implied 
that the person to whom i t applied ac tua l ly part ic ipated in 
removing the property from the owner's possess ion and was 
improper where the evidence showed that he merely received 
property already s t o l e n . Because defendant did not object to the 
in s t ruc t ion on the bas i s that i t created a mandatory rebuttable 
presumptionf he cannot ra i se t h i s object ion for the f i r s t time in 
a rehearing p e t i t i o n where the i s s u e was not even addressed on 
d irec t appeal, c . f . State v . Noren. 704 P.2d 568 (Utah 1985) . 
While in State v. Les l ey , 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983)r t h i s 
Court reviewed a jury ins truc t ion in the absence of an object ion 
in the t r i a l court to avoid i n j u s t i c e , t h i s Court did not engage 
in such a review on direct appeal in this case. Defendant should 
not now be allowed to raise an issue the Court did not deem 
worthy of review in the first instance for the first time in a 
rehearing request. State v. Chambers, 20 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 
(Oct. 21f 1985), was decided over two months prior to the 
decision in the instant cases. More importantly, Francis v. 
Franklin, 105 S.Ct. 1965 (1985), upon which Chambers relied, was 
decided eight months prior to the decision in defendant's cases. 
Defendant did not even attempt to supplement his brief on appeal 
with this claim of error during that time. Defendant knew or 
should have known of this issue during the pendency of his direct 
appeal, therefore, he has waived this claim of error, c.f. Lopez 
v. Shulsen, Case No. 18939, slip op. at 2 (Utah filed Jan. 16, 
1986). 
POINT II 
JURY INSTRUCTION 6(3) WAS A PERMISSIVE 
PRESUMPTION THAT MAY APPROPRIATELY BE 
GIVEN. 
Should this Court determine that it will review 
defendants claim that Instruction 6(3) created a mandatory 
rebuttable presumption, there was no error. The presumption was 
not a mandatory rebuttable presumption but was permissive in 
nature. 
Jury Instruction 6(3) stated: 
3. That the defendant knew or believed the 
property probably had been stolen at the time 
he received or retained it, and that the did 
so with an intent to conceal, sell, withhold, 
or aid in concealing, selling, or withholding 
any such property from the owner with a 
purpose to deprive the owner thereof. The 
Utah statutes provide that if a person has 
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possession of property recently s to len and 
gives no sa t i s fac to ry explanation of such 
possession, or i f as a dealer in second-hand 
merchandiser or if as a pawn broker, receives 
or r e t a i n s property secured a t a price far 
below the reasonable value, or if as a pawn 
broker or a person who operates a business 
dealing in second-hand merchandise he f a i l s 
to requi re a s e l l e r or person del iver ing the 
property to cer t i fy in wri t ing tha t he had a 
r i gh t to s e l l the property; and i f the value 
of the property exceeds $20,000, f a i l s to 
secure a f ingerpr in t from the s e l l e r , £lue jury may conclude the person had an intent to 
deprive the t rue owner of the property and 
may convict him, if a l l the circumstances do, 
in factr satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable 
dfinbt. t ha t the defendant i s gui l ty thereof. 
The s t a t u t e s do not r e s t r i c t or prevent the 
defendant from presenting evidence at t r i a l . 
The jury must determine, from a t o t a l i t y of 
the evidence, whether or not the defendant i s 
gu i l ty thereof. 
R. 28) . (emphasis added). This language c lear ly indicates t ha t 
he presumption i s permissive. Contrary to defendant 's claim on 
age 3 of hi s rehearing p e t i t i o n , a l l presumptions are not 
ncons t i tu t iona l in criminal cases . Only mandatory or mandatory 
ebut table presumptions were found unconst i tu t ional in Francis v. 
ranklinr 3 05 s . c t . 1965 (1985), and Sandstrom v, jiontana, 442 
. s . 510 (1979). State v. Chambers, 20 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 
Oct. 21 , 1985) disapproved only the use of language from Utah 
ode Ann. § 76 -6 -40 2 (J ) th at: made th e pr es umpt ion contai ned 
herein a mandatory rebut table presumption. 
Moreover, t h i s Court recently reaffirmed the use of a 
76-6-402 presumption. See Sta te v. P i t t s , Case Nc 20290, s l i p 
p. at 5 (Utah f i l ed Jan. 28, 1986) . This i s , of course, 
ua l i f ied by the proviso tha t i t i s a permissive presumption not 
mploying the prima facie language disapproved in Chambers and 
- 3 -
which was not used in the i n s t r u c t i o n given in t h i s case and 
quoted above. 
Defendant's claim that Ins truct ion 6(3) i s a mandatory 
rebuttable presumption i s m e r i t l e s s and rehearing should be 
denied. Moreover, use of the presumption in t h i s case wasf at 
b e s t , harmless error . In l i g h t of the evidence supporting the 
other inferences contained in Ins truc t ion 6 ( 3 ) , i t i s not l i k e l y 
that the jury would have acqui t ted defendant absent the § 76-6-402 
presumption. State v . Fontana. 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984) . 
POINT I I I 
DEFENDANT'S ALLEGATIONS OF ERROR IN 
CASE NO. 2 007 0 DO NOT MERIT REHEARING. 
A. FAIR MARKET VALUE. 
Defendant again claims that the S ta te did not present 
evidence of the f a i r market value of the ring and once again 
misrepresents t o t h i s Court the evidence presented at t r i a l . 
The S t a t e ' s expert , Richard Westf a c e r t i f i e d gemologist for 32 
years and jewelry s t o r e owner made a de ta i l ed appraisal of the 
r ing . West t e s t i f i e d at t r i a l that the f a i r market value i s based 
upon agreement between a w i l l i n g buyer and a w i l l i n g s e l l e r and 
that he does many appraisa l s for persons wanting to s e l l the ir 
used diamonds. West then estimated the value of the ring at 
$2 f 878.00 , wel l over the $1,000 minimum required for conv ic t ion . 
B. THIS COURT CORRECTLY CHARACTERIZED 
THE STATEMENTS IN THE AFFIDAVIT FOR 
THE SEARCH WARRANT AS ESSENTIALLY 
ACCURATE. 
While it is true that there are some minor discrep-
ancies between the language of the affidavit and the words used by 
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the undercover informant during the s t ing operation, these minor 
d i f ferences do not r i s e t o the l e v e l of knowingly, i n t e n t i o n a l l y , 
or r e c k l e s s l y making a f a l s e statement* The meaning of the words 
pas unmistakenly the same. 
For example, Gallegos t o l d defendant he got the ring 
"off of a burglary and I j u s t wanna get rid of i t . • . I don't 
zare how much you wanna give me for i t , I gotta get r id of i t . " 
(Ex. 4D). The d e t e c t i v e who swore that defendant was to ld the 
ring was s t o l e n and quick cash was needed heard segments of the 
conversation between Gallegos and defendant. Detect ive Cottam had 
i l s o gone through extens ive planning t o arrange the sa l e and 
reaffirmed with Gallegos that the transact ion had gone as planned 
ind the language used by Gallegos meant e s s e n t i a l l y that the ring 
?as s t o l e n and he wanted quick cash. 
Without re-arguing the pos i t i on already asserted by the 
State in i t s e n t i r e t y , the State r e i t e r a t e s i t s pos i t i on that the 
:acts a l l eged in the a f f i d a v i t were e s s e n t i a l l y accurate, 
apparently the Court agreed with that p o s i t i o n . Defendant has 
a i sed nothing new, and c i t e s no new case law in support of h i s 
:laim that the a f f i d a v i t was f a l s e . Defendant merely re-argues 
l i s claim that the a f f i d a v i t , d i s sec ted in to individual sentences 
:ontains d iscrepancies which he e l e v a t e s to cons t i tu t iona l 
proportion. The a f f i d a v i t , taken as a whole however, i s 
s s e n t i a l l y accurate and i t cannot be said that the o f f i cer 
e r i o u s l y doubted the truth of h i s statements. State v . Poland, 
32 Ariz . 269, 645 P.2d 784, 794-95 (1982). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Sta te requests t h i s Court, based upon the 
foregoing, to deny defendant's p e t i t i o n for rehearing. 
DATED t h i s rPfi/K day of February, 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
vfa/. 
SANDRA L.C 
Assistant Attorney General 
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